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Abstract
 
There are different well-established strategies for making a process plant inherently safer. The 
benefits of applying these strategies on reducing the overall risk inside a plant are obvious. 
However, some of these changes are rejected many times because they appear to be too costly. 
But if the effects of applying inherently safer design strategies are investigated not only on the 
processing costs of a plant but also on the potential accident costs, the decision would in fact be 
different. In this paper an optimization procedure is proposed which integrates both processing 
and accident costs for different design schemes. In this procedure, some of the design variables 
are chosen with regard to inherently safer design strategies. The objective function is the sum of 
accident costs and plant lifecycle processing costs. For assessing accident costs, consequence 
modeling techniques and probit functions are applied. Consequence modeling formulas and an 
objective function are codified in an optimizer package (MATLAB) and to accomplish the 
optimization process a process simulator (called HYSYS) is coupled with this package. The 
application of the proposed procedure is demonstrated by selecting an optimum process scheme 
for a Refrigeration plant as a case study. 
 
Keywords: Process Safety, Optimization, Inherently Safer Optimum Design, Consequence 
Modeling, safety economics.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A chemical manufacturing process is inherently safer if hazards associated with materials and 
operations have been reduced or eliminated. This reduction or elimination should be permanent 
and inseparable. This strategic approach is best implemented at an early stage in the process or 
plant design (Bollinger et al., 1996). Khan and Amyotte indicate that inherent safety can be 
incorporated at any stage of design and operation, and that its application at the earliest possible 
stages of any process yields the best results (Khan and Amyotte, 2002, 2003). 
There are four basic principles of inherently safer design (Kletz, 1991): 
 Minimize: Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances (also called intensiﬁcation). 
 Substitute: Replace a material with a less hazardous substance. 
 Moderate: Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous form of a material, or facilities 
that minimize the impact of a release of hazardous material or energy (also called 
attenuation and limitation). 
 Simplify: Design facilities which eliminate unnecessary complexity and make operating 
errors less likely. 
Application of inherent safety strategies can lead to improving safety in a plant and also lowering 
capital and operating costs (CCPS, 2000; Edwards and Lawrence, 1993; Hendershot, 2000). 
Khan and Amyotte (2002) replicated similar ﬁndings in their studies, which stated that 
considering the lifetime costs of a process and its operation, an inherently safer approach is a 
cost-optimal design option. However, implementation of inherent safety strategies requires a 
comprehensive economic analysis and risk assessment of all parts of a process since applying 
inherent safety to reduce a particular hazard may result in the increase of other hazards or may 
lead to unacceptably higher processing costs. 
Generally, the evaluation and comparison of the inherent safety level with respect to different 
design options can be categorized in two groups: 
 Evaluation by scoring the process features and the development of indices. 
 Quantitative assessment using consequence modeling and the calculation of accidents’ 
consequences. 
The majority of the attempts have been made in order to obtain indices to evaluate the inherent 
safety level. One the earliest indices was proposed by Edwards and Lawrence (Edwards and 
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Lawrence, 1993; Lawrence, 1996). An overall inherent safety index prototype was developed to 
illustrate the inherent safety potential of different process routes for manufacturing the same end 
products (Edwards et al., 1996). Another inherent safety index was developed using fuzzy logic 
by Gentile et al. (2003), using if-then rules to calculate the index. Palaniappan et al. (2002) 
developed a systematic methodology and an automated tool (known as i-Safe) to compare 
process routes for their inherent safety level and select the inherently safer ones developing 
ﬂowsheets among different design options. A detailed review of available tools and techniques 
for evaluating inherent safety using indices is given by Khan and Amyotte (2003, 2005). Also, a 
conceptual framework was proposed by Khan and Amyotte (2005) to integrate an inherent safety 
index throughout the life cycle of process design. 
The application of indices is a simple approach to evaluate inherent safety levels and to compare 
risk levels of different design schemes. However, it only provides a relative evaluation of the 
level of risk between different design options and does not consider vulnerable elements in the 
surrounding environment as possible hazard receptors. More important however, these indices do 
not demonstrate the possible, and often important, economic benefits of implementing inherent 
safety. 
In the second approach of evaluating inherent safety, it is possible to consider hazard receptors 
and to have a more clear understanding of the risk, using consequence modeling. Mohd Shariff et 
al. (2006) have developed a demonstrative tool called “integrated Risk Estimation Tool” (iRET) 
that uses process simulation software (HYSYS) and spreadsheets (MS Excel) as platforms. iRET 
was developed for estimating risk levels and consequence analysis from vapor cloud explosions 
by using the TNT equivalence method and the TNO correlation method. Leong and Shariff 
(2008) reviewed available techniques for quantiﬁcation of inherent safety levels and addressed 
the shortcomings of current techniques by proposing the direct integration of a process design 
simulator with an integrated inherent safety index called “inherent safety index module” (ISIM). 
An optimization methodology was proposed by Medina et al. (2009), in which both cost and risk 
were taken into account to obtain an optimum solution with respect to both economic aspects and 
safety features. The objective function defined by Medina et al. (2009) includes both investment 
costs and the cost of potential accidents. They applied the proposed procedure for two case 
studies, a toxic release and a BLEVE/ﬁreball, to determine the optimum number of storage tanks 
in a chemical plant. Another tool called “Toxic release consequence analysis tool” (TORCAT) 
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was developed by Shariff and Zaini (2010) to analyze the consequence of a toxic release in order 
to evaluate the inherent safety level of different process options by determining the concentration 
of the released gas at a specific distance. Patel et al. (2010) applied a “Computer Aided 
Molecular Design” (CAMD) technique to select inherently safer solvents for a solvent operation. 
In their work, consequence modeling and regulatory guidance from EPA RMP had been 
integrated into the process simulation to incorporate principles of inherently safer design into the 
early stages of conceptual process design. Recently, Bernechea and Arnaldos Viger (2013) 
presented a method for optimizing the design of storage plants and for minimizing the risk by 
calculating the ideal number of tanks. Unlike Medina et al. (2009), they used a probabilistic 
approach to assess risk.  
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no comprehensive study that provides an 
optimization procedure to obtain the optimal inherently safer design schemes by considering the 
evaluation of economic benefits of implementing inherent safety strategies. Although Medina et 
al. (2009) and Bernechea and Arnaldos Viger (2013) used both financial and accident costs to 
obtain an optimum design scheme, they did not provide any conceptual procedure to consider 
inherent safety strategies in their optimization procedure. 
In this paper, a procedure is developed to integrate inherent safety assessments in the synthesis of 
flowsheets and for the optimization of processes. In this procedure, the inherent safety strategies 
are considered in the synthesis and optimization procedure by considering decision parameters 
associated with each strategy. To study the effects of implementing inherent safety concepts the 
costs of accidents are considered besides other processing costs.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
In addition to the difference in processing costs (summation of fixed and operating costs), 
different designs and options have a different potential of accident occurrence and severity. It is 
possible that a design, which has lower processing costs, has more associated hazards and 
consequently more accident costs. An accident is linked to all kinds of direct and indirect costs 
(Reniers and Audenaert, 2009). To perform a realistic optimization, all costs associated with a 
process, including accident costs, which are influenced by decision parameters of a design 
procedure, should be taken into account, since in considering inherently safer design alternatives 
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there are often conflicting benefits and deficiencies associated with each different option 
(Bollinger et al., 1996). It is thus essential to evaluate the effects of inherent safety 
implementation on all potential hazards and all economic aspects of the plant. 
The Developed procedure to incorporate accident costs into the optimization procedure is shown 
in Figure 1 and will be explained further. 
 
 
Figure 1: Synthesis and Optimization Procedure including risk assessment 
 
2.1 Definition and Determination of Superstructure 
In the first stage to obtain the optimum design, a reducible structure, known as “superstructure”, 
should be created in which all feasible process options and all feasible interconnections that are 
candidates for an optimal design structure, are embedded. In this superstructure, some decision 
variables regarding the inherent safety strategies should also be considered. 
 
2.2. Determination of Variables 
Structural variables (such as column sequencing, type of reactor, etc.) specify the path, sequence 
and framework of an operation and operational variables (such as pressure ratio for compressors, 
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heat exchanger outlet temperatures, etc.) adjust operating conditions in any process path. 
Whether structural or operational, the variables can be classified in two categories. The first 
category concerns variables required during the design of a process. Although these variables 
affect the inherent safety level, the effect is indirect. The second type of variables concern those 
that are chosen and changed according to the strategies of inherent safety. For example: 
 Alternate reaction chemistry; 
 Different heat carriers, different solvents and the alike; 
 Type of equipment (e.g. different reactor technologies, etc.); 
 Equipment arrangement (series or parallel); 
 Alternate processing or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, concentration; 
 Distances between equipment (Plant layout). 
Selecting any of these variables is based on the nature of the system being considered for 
optimization. Application of any of these different alternatives will lead to different levels of 
inherent safety and different processing costs. An optimization procedure of selecting the 
optimum design variable takes into account the probable processing costs as well as the accident 
costs. 
2.3 Cost Estimation  
 
2.3.1 Processing costs 
After selecting a specific process scheme, fixed and operating costs can be calculated. For 
calculating these costs, the numbers of equipment, their sizes, capacities, and other specifications 
influencing the cost such as energy consumption, should be determined. 
 
2.3.2Accident costs 
When an accident occurs, it imposes some direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include for 
example medical payments for injured people, costs of fatalities, and costs of damages to 
structures. Indirect costs encompass losses arising from business interruptions and penalties from 
the authorities. This paper focuses on direct costs only. An approach that can be used to help 
calculating direct costs, is consequence modeling. After the selection of a hazardous material 
release scenario, source modeling is performed. The results include the total quantity released, 
the release rate and the material phase. Subsequently, dispersion modeling provides the 
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downwind concentration and area affected. The next step of consequence modeling contains fire 
and explosion modeling from which the results may include blast overpressure and the radiant 
heat flux. Consequently, using appropriate effect modeling, the number of individuals affected 
and the property damage can be calculated. Finally, using of individuals affected and the 
property damage, and considering the costs of any affected element, the total costs of any 
accident scenario can be obtained. The application of consequence modeling to calculate 
accident costs will be shown in more detail while discussing the case study in section 3.3.2 of 
this paper. 
 
2.4. Objective Function 
The optimization objective function establishes the relationship between the overall cost and the 
decision variable as: 
              (                 ) (i) 
In this study the overall cost is the sum of all costs for each design scheme which can be 
expressed as: 
             ∑                   ∑               
                        
 
(ii) 
and the processing costs as: 
                 ∑ (                           )
          
 
 
(iii) 
The accident costs express the costs regarding with all elements affected by accident such as 
injuries costs, fatalities costs, damages to structures and properties, and etc. 
Fixed costs and accident costs are usually expressed in capitalized format (e.g., $), while 
operating costs are usually expressed with annualized dimensions (e.g., $/year). Therefore, to 
insert them simultaneously into an objective function, all relevant costs should be annualized or 
capitalized for the plant life cycle. The optimal design would be the scheme having the lowest 
objective function value. This research displays all processing costs in capitalized form to be 
consistent with accident costs obtained from damage assessment based on consequence 
modeling. 
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3. Case Study 
 
3.1Refrigeration Cycle 
Refrigeration cycles are used in the process industries for many reasons, including separation and 
chemical storage at low temperatures. Usually, this unit imposes great costs to a plant. This is 
due to the significant energy that is usually consumed by the compressor in the cycle. In 
chemical processes, especially gas and petroleum processing plants, with respect to high required 
refrigeration load and availability of hydrocarbons, the use of a hydrocarbon refrigeration cycle 
is very common. However, hydrocarbons have a great flammability hazard potential. So, the 
optimal design of this particular unit, in terms of both processing costs and safety, is very 
important with respect to plant safety and economics. Different design options are available. Due 
to the crucial importance of this cycle and the availability of different design options, the 
refrigeration cycle is selected to be studied in this paper. It is evident that the proposed procedure 
is generic and thus potentially applicable to any other chemical processing plant.  
The selected case is based on a real industrial plant in which the target is refrigerating dry natural 
gas to -13.2 
o
C. The specification of dry natural gas is given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Specification of gas stream which is intended to be chilled 
Component, Mole % 
0.843 Methane 
0.054    Ethane 
0.021    Propane 
0.020    Other Hydrocarbons 
0.034 Nitrogen 
0.021 Carbon Dioxide 
0.007 Sulphur Compounds 
19.5 Molecular Weight 
70.4 Pressure, barg 
7.9 Temperature, 
o
C 
612,140 Flow, kg/h 
 
A typical single-stage refrigeration cycle is shown in Figure 2 and is characterized with four 
major elements: Compressor, Condenser, Evaporator and JT-Valve. Another common cycle can 
be designed as depicted in Figure 3: the refrigerant enters a drum after passing through the JT-
Valve and only the liquid phase is used in the evaporator. 
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Figure 2: Typical Single-Stage Refrigeration Cycle 
 
 
Figure 3: Single-Stage Refrigeration Cycle with a Flash Drum 
 
It is shown that cycle efficiency can be increased by adding a Flash Economizer using two stages 
of pressure drop as shown in Figure 4 (Manning and Thompson, 1991). 
Therefore, these typical design schemes can be used as base cases to construct the superstructure 
and to determine decision variables in the optimization process. 
 
Figure 4: Two-Stage Refrigeration Cycle with a Flash Drum (Flash Economizer) 
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3.2Decision Variables for Refrigeration Cycle 
For the cycle under study, water is used as coolant in the condenser and a typical temperature 
difference of 5
o
C is used for both the condenser and the evaporator (Smith, 2005). Consequently, 
the final compression pressure is calculated based on the refrigerant saturation pressure and 
condenser refrigerant pressure drop. The number of pressure drop stages is equal to two, except 
for the single-stage cycles (Figure 2 and Figure 3) in which case it is equal to one. Therefore, the 
chosen decision variables, which complete the design of the cycle, are the following: 
 Refrigerant type 
 Flash Economizer operating pressure 
However, these variables affect the inherent safety level and consequently the severity of 
damages and may have some conflicts with one or more strategies of inherent safety. 
According to the Minimization strategy of inherent safety, the number of parallel paths (NPPs) 
of pressure drop, shown in Figure 5, can also be a decision variable. Because increasing the NPP 
reduces the refrigerant rate in each path and consequently, the size of the drum and the 
refrigerant inventory of the drum, will be smaller. Here, only the structure (NPP) of the process 
has been considered variable and the type of the material of structure and equipment has been 
supposed to be fixed. 
Refrigeration type as a decision variable is considered as an operational variable which can be 
determined by changing the refrigerant composition. Likewise the operating pressure is 
considered as an operational variable. The NPP as a structural variable is determined in the 
superstructure. The superstructure is shown schematically in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Intended superstructure of refrigeration cycle 
 
The superstructure is simulated in a process simulator (HYSYS). Other calculations (equipment 
sizing, consequence modeling and cost estimation) are codified in MATLAB as well as an 
optimization algorithm to find the optimal value of the objective function (sum of processing and 
accident costs). 
 
3.3 Estimation of Costs 
 
3.3.1 Processing costs 
Processing costs are the sum of fixed and operating costs. Fixed and operating costs can be 
calculated using the number, type, size and required energy for any equipment. For the 
refrigeration cycle, as shown in Figure 5, the only processing costs that are considered in this 
study are as follows: 
 Purchasing cost and required energy cost of the compressors 
 Purchasing cost and required energy cost of the condenser 
 Purchasing cost of the flash drum(s) 
 Purchasing cost of the evaporators(s) 
The material of all equipment in this paper is supposed to be carbon steel as a base material in 
cost estimation. The piping cost is considered to be 13% of the total fixed costs (Peters et al., 
1968). Required input data which are necessary in equipment sizing and thus cost estimation are 
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extracted from the process simulator HYSYS. This required input information as well as the 
output information which is necessary for optimization, is listed in Table 2. This table also lists 
the outputs of this step, required to establish the objective function and to perform consequence 
modeling. Details of equipment sizing and designing can be found in Towler and Sinnott (2008). 
 
Table 2: Processing costs estimation stage required input and output data 
Required Output Data Required Input Data Equipment 
Diameter, Height, Liquid and Vapor inventories, 
Fixed costs 
Inlet Flow and Density (Two 
phases) 
Drum (s) 
Fixed and Operating costs Power Consumption Compressor (s) 
Fixed and Operating costs 
Area, Cooling Water 
Consumption 
Condenser 
Fixed costs Area Evaporator (s) 
 
3.3.2 Accident costs 
As mentioned earlier, in this study the consequence modeling approach is used to estimate 
accident costs. When release scenarios are selected based on a hazard identification study, the 
modeling of the consequences gives the analyst a realistic understanding of the damage potential 
regardless of scenarios’ frequencies. 
For the refrigeration cycle in this paper, hydrocarbons are used as refrigerant and an 
instantaneous release of the entire contents of hazardous materials in the flash drum(s) due to an 
explosion (BLEVE), followed by a fireball, is considered as worst-case scenario. The concept of 
worst-case scenario is thus used as the basis for further calculation of maximum total costs. 
Consequences of this type of accidents can be very severe, especially in areas close to the release 
point (CCPS, 2000). In the refrigeration cycle, the Flash Economizer has the largest inventory of 
hydrocarbons and consequently may be the origin of the most severe accident scenarios in 
comparison with other equipment. This assumption is supported by a CCPS (2003) report which 
compared the number of losses by type of equipment. This report assigns the largest losses to 
vessels and columns by 21 percent of total losses in refineries and petrochemical plants. 
Therefore, this paper only focuses on the drum(s) as hazard source(s). 
Since an instantaneous release is assumed and also due to BLEVE/fireball accidents occurring at 
the release point, source modeling and dispersion modeling is not required.  
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The outcome of a BLEVE is a blast wave which produces overpressure. The TNT equivalence 
method is used to model this accident. In addition, the source point method is selected to model 
fire and to calculate the fireball duration and thermal radiation resulting from this accident. More 
details of these methods can be found in Casal (2008). Table 3 shows the required inputs to 
model these accidents and indicates output information that is required for other steps of 
consequence modeling. 
 
Table 3: BLEVE/fireball consequence modeling input and output data 
Output Data Required Input Data Accident  
  Vessel Volume 
BLEVE 
  Refrigerant Density 
  Liquid Inventory 
 Blast Overpressure 
profile 
 Vessel Pressure 
  Refrigerant Temperature 
  Refrigerant Normal Boiling Point 
  Refrigerant Latent Heat 
  Refrigerant Inventory 
Fireball 
 Radiation Intensity 
profile 
 Vulnerable Element Distance to Accident 
Center 
 Fireball duration  Atmospheric Relative Humidity  
  Ambient Temperature 
  Vessel Pressure 
  Heat of Combustion of the Refrigerant 
 
For the consequence modeling of the selected scenario, atmospheric conditions need to be 
specified. Prevailing atmospheric conditions in the region where the process is going to be 
constructed are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Atmospheric conditions of the region 
30 
o
C Ambient Temperature 
1 bar Ambient Pressure 
40 % Ambient Relative Humidity 
F Stability Class 
1.5 m/s Wind Velocity 
 
In this case study, different potential damage receptors were identified: 
 80 operators in the surrounding area (in 130m radius). 
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 8 buildings (B4-Type according to API (1995) definition) at a distance of 300 m 
downwind; each  building has four occupants. 
In the case under study, it is assumed that there was not any major equipment in the vicinity of 
the refrigeration cycles. So damages to equipment are not studied. 
Probit analysis is used to relate the overpressure profile and also the fireball duration and the 
thermal radiation profile, resulting from BLEVE modeling and fireball modeling, to the 
probability of damages for any of the above mentioned vulnerable elements in specified 
distances. So the outdoor fatality due to overpressure and thermal radiation, as well as the 
damages to buildings due to overpressure, are calculated using appropriate probit models. For 
buildings, two levels of damages are considered: collapse and major structural damage. Hence, 
four probit models are used to calculate damages: a probit model to calculate the probability of 
outdoor fatalities due to overpressure, a probit model to calculate the probabilities of outdoor 
fatalities due to thermal radiation, a probit model to calculate the probabilities of the collapse of 
buildings, and a probit model to calculate the probabilities of major structural damages. Details 
of these probit equations can be found in Casal (2008). The probability of indoor fatalities is 
calculated using the approach presented in API (1995) and Badri et al. (2013). In addition, the 
number of injuries due to each accident (BLEVE and fireball) is a function of the number of  
fatalities resulting from that accident (Casal, 2008; Medina et al., 2009). In this paper it is 
assumed that thermal radiation does not affect buildings and their occupants.  
Finally, by using (i) the percentage of collapsed buildings, (ii) the percentage of buildings which 
receive major structural damage, (iii) the number of fatalities, and (iv) the number of injuries, the 
total accident costs can be estimated. This estimation evidently requires costs of each element. 
Assigning a value to a life or to an injured person is very challenging and a function of many 
factors (such as social factors, age, damage severity, etc.) that vary from country to country. The 
cost of a fatality in Iran in this paper is considered approximately 350,000 $ based on a study 
done by Mohammad Fam et al. (2007) and the cost of an injury has been considered as 160,000$ 
according to the same reference. The cost of one building has been taken as 100,000$ per unit. 
Also the cost has been considered to be 100% of the cost of the building in the case of collapse 
and 70% for major structural damage (Medina et al., 2009). 
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3.4Optimization Framework 
 
Figure 6 shows the flow of data between different optimization elements. The Optimizer 
determines and sends the decision variable to the Simulator to complete a design. The evaluation 
variables (such as flow, density, etc.) are extracted from the Simulator to perform consequence 
modeling and cost estimation. Finally, the optimum design in which the overall costs are as low 
as possible, are determined.  
 
 
Figure 6: Optimization Elements Interaction 
 
4. Results 
 
For a complete study of inherent safety strategies and the accompanying decision variables, the 
effects of the different safety strategies on all aspects of a process, should be investigated. In this 
section 4, the effects of decision variables such as refrigerant type, drum operating pressure, and 
multiple parallel paths, on processing costs (summation of fixed and operating costs), accident 
costs, and hence on overall costs (summation of  processing and accident costs) are presented. 
 
4.1 Study the Effect of refrigerant type 
The operating temperature of the Evaporator is one of the basic criteria to select the refrigerant 
type, which has also significant effects on processing costs. On the other hand, the Substitution 
strategy of inherent safety states that the right choice of refrigerant type leads to a lower risk 
level. 
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Table 5 presents the different refrigerants which were considered for this case study. The effect 
of these refrigerants on the overall cost (sum of processing and accident costs) is shown in Figure 
7. The effect of this variable is studied for the single-stage cycles (Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
 
Table 5: Different refrigerants considered in this study 
Normal Boiling Point (
o
C) Composition Refrigerant Name 
-42 100% Propane R290 
-22 30% Propane + 70% i-Butane HCB1 
-54 70% Propane+ 30% Ethane HCB2 
 
The processing costs are reduced by adding a drum for a specific refrigerant. This reduction is 
due to the fact that by adding a drum, only the liquid phase passes through the Evaporator. 
Because the heat capacity of the liquid stream is higher than that of the two phase stream, the 
required flow for the cycle with a drum is less than the typical cycle. 
For the single-stage cycle with drum, the compression ratios for propane, HCB1 and HCB2, are 
5.7, 8.5 and 5.5 respectively. As HCB2 is lighter than two other refrigerants and consequently 
has lower latent heat, more flow is needed for the cycle and as the compression ratio for this 
cycle and for the propane cycle is approximately equal, the HCB2 compressors require more 
energy. For HCB1, a lower flow is needed, but the compression ratio is much higher than that of 
the two other options and consequently the outcome of these two factors results in more 
compressor required energy in comparison with the propane cycle. 
The typical cycle doesn’t have any flash drum, and consequently there is no considerable hazard 
according to the assumption that the cycle main hazard source is the drum. A refrigeration cycle 
with a heavier refrigerant has lower accident costs, because the required flow rate for heavier 
refrigerant is less than that of a lighter one. Consequently the drum size becomes smaller and the 
available mass for any accident is reduced. So the overall cost is lower for the typical single-
stage cycle (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: The effect of refrigerant type on overall cost for single-stage cycles 
 
4.2 Study the effect of drum operating pressure 
Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10 show the variation in processing costs, accident costs and 
overall cost, respectively, by changing the operating pressure of the drum. 
 
Figure 8: The effect of drum pressure on processing costs for a two-stage cycle 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8, the processing cost has an optimum in 610 kPa but the accident costs 
are increased (Figure 9) with increasing pressure, due to two reasons. Firstly, as the pressure 
increases the severity of any probable BLEVE will be higher. Secondly, due to increasing the 
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liquid fraction entering the drum, the liquid hold up in the drum increases and consequently more 
hydrocarbon inventory will be available in any subsequent fireball. 
 
Figure 9: The effect of drum pressure on accident costs for a two-stage cycle 
 
Similar to the processing costs, the overall cost has an optimum too, as shown in Figure 10. But 
this optimum pressure (590 kPa) does not differ considerably from the optimum value for 
processing costs (610 kPa) because the pressure does not have a significant effect on accident 
costs in comparison with processing costs for this case. 
 
Figure 10: The effect of drum pressure on overall cost for a two-stage cycle 
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4.3 Study the effect of multiple parallel paths 
For a two-stage cycle, the effect of increasing the number of parallel paths (NPPs) on the costs is 
shown in Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13. 
By increasing this variable, operating costs remain constant but fixed costs increase 
approximately linearly because of the change in the number of drums and evaporators. Drum 
pressure is fixed at 400 kPa. 
 
Figure 11: The effect of number of parallel paths on processing costs 
 
As the NPP increases, the refrigerant flow in each path decreases and consequently the size of 
each drum and its inventory reduces. This leads to lower accident costs. There is a major change 
in adding the second path to the first due to the considerable reduction of consequences. By 
increasing the number of paths, the accident costs continue to decrease but the reduction rate 
decreases as the number of paths increases. 
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Figure 12: The effect of number of parallel paths on accident costs 
 
A gradual increase of processing costs eventually counterbalances accident costs reduction and 
this leads to a theoretical optimum point for overall cost, once NPP equals to approximately 11. 
Of course, this value for NPP produces a high complex cycle. 
 
Figure 13: The effect of number of parallel paths on overall cost 
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4.4 The Inherently Safer Optimum Design 
The application of the proposed procedure for the refrigeration cycle under study, considering all 
of the above mentioned variables, determines the optimum design scheme with the parameters 
shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Optimum Design Characteristics 
Propane Refrigerant 
2 stages Number of Pressure Drop Stages 
11 Paths Number of Parallel Paths 
600 kPa Drum Pressure 
39.0x10
6 
$ Processing Costs 
0.10 x10
6 
$ Accident Costs 
39.1 x10
6 
$ Overall Cost 
 
The optimum NPP according to the optimization output is fixed at 11. So this design scheme will 
lead to the lowest overall cost. But another factor shall be considered. The complexity of 
operation and incident frequency (such as leak frequency) may be increased by increasing NPP. 
Sensitivity analysis such as the one described further may help deciding about the optimum 
number of parallel paths. 
 
Table 7: Optimum Designs for different number of parallel paths 
Number of 
Parallel Path 
Drum Pressure 
(kPa) 
Processing 
Costs (x10
6
 $) 
Accident 
Costs (x10
6
 $) 
Overall 
Cost (x10
6
 $) 
1 590 38.80 21.78 60.60 
2 540 38.92 13.47 52.39 
3 410 39.72 8.28 47.99 
4 470 39.26 3.63 42.89 
5 530 39.01 1.63 40.64 
6 560 38.96 0.75 39.71 
7 590 38.94 0.39 39.34 
8 590 38.96 0.23 39.19 
9 600 38.98 0.16 39.14 
10 600 39.00 0.12 39.12 
11 600 39.00 0.10 39.10 
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Table 7 shows the optimum found characteristics for different refrigeration cycles with different 
given NPP. This table demonstrates that for more than 6 NPP the overall cost does not change 
considerably and further increasing NPP does not affect the costs significantly. 
In comparison with a typical cycle, the inherently safer optimum design (with 6 NPP) has 9 
percent lower overall cost. Also this optimum design shows 21x10
6
 $ reduction in accident costs 
in comparison with a two-stage cycle (NPP=1, a common cycle in industries), while the 
processing costs are increased insignificantly. 
As mentioned before, the complexity of the cycle is increased by increasing the NPP. It seems 
that “simplification” is an underrated strategy in Inherently Safer Design.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper considers processing- and accident costs to optimize design decisions with respect to 
costs and safety. The approach is applicable for all stages of a plant life cycle where modification 
or optimization is required. A case study was used to show the applicability and the benefits of 
the proposed procedure. Case study results show that the consideration of inherent safety 
strategies in process synthesis can reduce significantly potential accident costs; while often other 
processing costs change slightly. This procedure provides an absolute, objective and financial 
measure for managers with regard to benefits of implementing inherent safety concepts. 
Although consequence modeling is the best way to estimate accident damages and finally to 
specify effectiveness of inherent safety strategies, the accidents have a probabilistic nature. 
Therefore, the accident frequency and the effects of ISD strategies on it should be taken into 
account in future research. Also it is essential that future works focus on developing a method to 
consider the ‘Simplification’ strategy of inherent safety in the design process. 
23 
 
References 
 
API, 1995. Recommended Practice 752: Management of Hazards Associated with 
Location of Process Plant Buildings, 2nd ed. American Petroleum  Institute, 
Washington,  DC. 
Badri, N., Nourai, F., Rashtchian, D., 2013. A multivariable approach for 
estimation of vapor cloud explosion frequencies for independent congested spaces 
to be used in occupied building risk assessment. Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection 91, 19-30. 
Bernechea, E.J., Arnaldos Viger, J., 2013. Design optimization of hazardous 
substance storage facilities to minimize project risk. Safety Science 51, 49-62. 
Bollinger, R.E., Clark, D.G., Dowell, A.M., Hendershot, D.C., Lutz, W.K., 
Meszaros, S.I., Park, D.E., Wixom, E.D., Crowl, D.A., 1996. Inherently safer 
chemical processes, A life cycle approach. Center for Chemical Process Safety. 
Casal, J., 2008. Evaluation of the effects and consequences of major accidents in 
industrial plants. Elsevier, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
CCPS, 2000. Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2nd ed. 
New York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 
Edwards, D.W., Lawrence, D., 1993. Assessing the inherent safety of chemical 
process routes: Is there a relation between plant costs and inherent safety? Process 
Safety and Environmental Protection 71, 252-258. 
Edwards, D.W., Lawrence, D., Rushton, A., 1996. Quantifying the inherent safety 
of chemical process routes, 5th World Congress of Chemical Engineering. New 
York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, San Diego, CA, pp. 14-18. 
Gentile, M., Rogers, W.J., Mannan, M.S., 2003. Development of a Fuzzy Logic-
Based Inherent Safety Index. Process Safety and Environmental Protection 81, 
444-456. 
Hendershot, D.C., 2000. Process minimization: making plants safer. Chemical 
engineering progress 96, 35-40. 
Khan, F.I., Amyotte, P.R., 2002. Inherent safety in offshore oil and gas activities: a 
review of the present status and future directions. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries 15, 279-289. 
Khan, F.I., Amyotte, P.R., 2003. How to make inherent safety practice a reality. 
The Canadian Journal of Chemical Engineering 81, 2-16. 
Khan, F.I., Amyotte, P.R., 2005. I2SI: A comprehensive quantitative tool for 
inherent safety and cost evaluation. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries 18, 310-326. 
Kletz, T.A., 1991. Plant design for safety: a user-friendly approach. New York: 
Hemisphere Publishing Corporation. 
24 
 
Lawrence, D., 1996. Quantifying inherent safety of chemical process routes. 
Loughborough University. 
Leong, C.T., Shariff, A.M., 2008. Inherent safety index module (ISIM) to assess 
inherent safety level during preliminary design stage. Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection 86, 113-119. 
Manning, F.S., Thompson, R.E., 1991. Oilfield Processing of Petroleum: Natural 
Gas. Pennwell books. 
Medina, H., Arnaldos, J., Casal, J., 2009. Process design optimization and risk 
analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22, 566-573. 
Mohammad Fam, I., Zokaei, H., Simaei, N., 2007. Epidemiological evaluation of 
fatal occupational accidents and estimation of related human costs in Tehran. 
Journal of Zahedan University of Medical Sciences and Health Services 8, 299-
307. 
Mohd Shariff, A., Rusli, R., Leong, C.T., Radhakrishnan, V.R., Buang, A., 2006. 
Inherent safety tool for explosion consequences study. Journal of Loss Prevention 
in the Process Industries 19, 409-418. 
Palaniappan, C., Srinivasan, R., Tan, R.B., 2002. Expert system for the design of 
inherently safer processes. 2. Flowsheet development stage. Industrial & 
engineering chemistry research 41, 6711-6722. 
Patel, S.J., Ng, D., Mannan, M.S., 2010. Inherently safer design of solvent 
processes at the conceptual stage: Practical application for substitution. Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23, 483-491. 
Peters, M.S., Timmerhaus, K.D., West, R.E., Timmerhaus, K., West, R., 1968. 
Plant design and economics for chemical engineers. McGraw-Hill New York. 
Reniers, G.L.L., Audenaert, A., 2009. Chemical plant innovative safety 
investments decision-support methodology. Journal of Safety Research 40, 411-
419. 
Shariff, A.M., Zaini, D., 2010. Toxic release consequence analysis tool (TORCAT) 
for inherently safer design plant. Journal of Hazardous Materials 182, 394-402. 
Smith, R., 2005. Chemical process design and integration. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 
Chichester, UK. 
Towler, G.P., Sinnott, R.K., 2008. Chemical Engineering Design: Principles, 
Practice, and Economics of Plant and Process Design. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands. 
 
 
